This paper examines how the preferences of a large economy's central bank a¤ect the trade-o¤ between output and in ‡ation volatility faced by a central bank of a small open economy by analyzing the impact of a global cost-push shock. We demonstrate that under the assumption of producer currency pricing, the trade-o¤ faced by the small open economy is likely to worsen as the Foreign central bank becomes more focused on output stabilisation relative to in ‡ation stabilisation; but the opposite is true in the case of local currency pricing.
Introduction
Over the period from about 2003 to 2008 the world experienced a sharp rise in the price of oil and other commodities, which put upward pressure on in ‡ation across the globe as discussed by IMF (2008) . Moreover, as documented by IMF (2009), output growth has contracted sharply in most countries following the adverse shock to the international …nancial system, which gained momentum during the course of 2008. This has posed challenges for central banks that on the one hand wish to stimulate growth while at the same time ensuring that in ‡ation expectations remain anchored. Since central banks di¤er in terms of their preferences for stabilising output and in ‡ation, monetary policy has responded di¤erently to this challenge across countries. 1 When several countries are hit by the same global shock, how do other central banks' reactions to that shock a¤ect the trade-o¤ between in ‡ation and output stabilization faced by a central bank of a small open economy? A relatively small, open economy, such as the United Kingdom, is potentially a¤ected by foreign monetary policy through a demand channel as well as a supply channel. The demand channel works as follows: By stimulating global demand, an expansionary monetary policy abroad can potentially lead to higher demand for UK goods (aggregate demand e¤ect). But a foreign monetary expansion also tends to lead to an appreciation of sterling, which may dampen demand for UK goods (expenditure switching e¤ect). The overall e¤ect on the demand for UK goods of a foreign monetary expansion therefore depends on the strength of the aggregate demand e¤ect relative to the expenditure switching e¤ect.
Foreign monetary policy also a¤ects UK supply. This is because foreign monetary policy a¤ects the terms of trade, and shifts in the terms of trade can a¤ect workers' incentives to work for a given real wage. On the one hand, a deterioration in the terms of trade makes workers feel poorer, thus inducing them to work harder (income e¤ect). On the other hand, it also reduces the amount of consumption which they can obtain by working an additional hour, and this diminishes the incentives to work (substitution e¤ect). Depending on the preferences of households either the income e¤ect or the substitution e¤ect may dominate.
Since the monetary policy of central banks in the United Kingdom's large trading partners, such as the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Federal Reserve (Fed), can in ‡uence demand and supply in the United Kingdom, their preferences can impact on the trade-o¤ between in ‡ation and output volatility faced by the Bank of England. This paper examines how the preference of a large economy's central bank a¤ects the trade-o¤ between output and in ‡ation volatility faced by a central bank of a small open economy, using a New Keynesian model of a small open economy along the lines of Gali & Monacelli (2005) and Paoli (2009) . In what follows, we refer to the small open economy as 'Home', and the large open economy as 'Foreign'. To conduct this analysis, we examine the impact of a global cost-push shock, which generates an output-in ‡ation trade-o¤ both for the Home and the Foreign central bank.
The speci…c question which this paper seeks to address is: does it make it harder for the Home central bank to bring down in ‡ation without causing a large contraction of output when the Foreign central bank is 'dovish', and is hesitant to bring down in ‡ation quickly? As we will demonstrate, the answer to this question is nontrivial. We …nd that the impact of a more 'dovish'Foreign central bank on the trade-o¤ faced by the Home central bank depends on two key assumptions of the model: it depends on the currency in which exports are denominated, and it depends on the substitutability between goods produced in Home and Foreign. The choice of invoicing currency is important since it determines how Foreign monetary policy a¤ects Home's terms of trade. The substitutability between goods determines the extent to which demand switches between Home and Foreign goods following a change in relative prices, and it determines how Home labour supply responds to ‡uctuations in the terms of trade.
Under the assumption of producer currency pricing (i.e. products are priced in the currency of the exporters), we …nd that as the Foreign central bank becomes more dovish -i.e. it places less weight on stabilising in ‡ation relative to stabilising output in its objective function -the Home central bank is likely to be facing a more adverse in ‡ation-output trade-o¤ in the sense that for a given level of output volatility it has to tolerate greater volatility of in ‡ation. But under local currency pricing (i.e. products are priced in the currency of consumers), assuming that the prices set by Home exporters are su¢ ciently sticky, the Home central bank's trade o¤ improves as the Foreign central bank becomes more dovish.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the small open economy model used for the analysis. Section 3 discusses the key results of our analysis. Section 4 discusses the implications of our results and section 5 concludes.
The model
The analysis is conducted within a dynamic two-country general equilibrium model, which consists of 'Home'(indexed by H) and 'Foreign'(indexed by F ). In what follows, all Foreign variables are denoted by *. Representative households in each country supply labour to monopolistically competitive …rms producing di¤erentiated goods, and consume goods produced both at Home and in Foreign. Wages are assumed to be fully ‡exible, but prices are assumed to be sticky as in Calvo (1983) . All goods are tradable, but the existence of a home bias in preferences allows us to calibrate the degree of openness of the Home country. We adopt the approach of Paoli (2009) , which …rst solves for the equilibrium of the two-country model, and then takes the limit of the Home's size to zero. Consequently, the Home economy becomes a small open economy whereas the Foreign economy behaves like a closed economy: while Foreign monetary policy a¤ects Home, the reverse is not true, because Foreign households consume a tiny amount of Home goods. The model is in the class of the cashless-limiting economies, see e.g. Woodford (2003) . Here, we only present a summary of the model's equilibrium conditions in log-linearized form. For the derivation of these equations, see Appendix A of Paoli (2009) .
As a starting point we assume that goods are priced in the producer's currency, so that any changes in the nominal exchange rate are immediately and fully passed through to the domestic price of imports. Thus, a depreciation of Home currency against Foreign currency will lead to an immediate rise in Home goods price in the Foreign market, and an immediate fall in Foreign goods price in the Home market. Under producer currency pricing, the model's equilibrium conditions for Home economy can be characterised by the equations presented below. All variables are expressed in log deviations from steady state, i.e. b X =
X X X
:
The variables b C t and b C t denote Home and Foreign consumption, b Y t denotes Home output, d
T oT represents the terms of trade, c RS denotes the real exchange rate and c RS denotes its change from one period to the next (a rise in c RS indicates a Home depreciation). Similarly b S t represents the change in the nominal exchange rate. b t denotes Home consumer price in ‡ation while b t is Foreign consumer price in ‡ation (which dynamics are de…ned by (9)), and b H t denotes Home producer price in ‡ation. The exogenous global cost-push shock is captured by b t , which is the wedge between marginal utility of consumption and marginal disutility of production both in Home and Foreign. This is an ine¢ cient shock which increases in ‡ation both in Home and Foreign and creates a trade-o¤ for the central banks between stabilising output and in ‡ation. The remaining parameters are described in Table 1 Degree of openness ( ) 0:3 Subjective discount factor ( ) 0:99 Elasticity of substitution across the di¤erentiated products ( ) 10 Probability of not being able to re-set price ( ) 0:66 (4) is a weighted sum of Home producer price in ‡ation and import price in ‡ation. Under the assumption of producer currency pricing, import price in ‡ation (5) is the sum of Foreign producer price in ‡ation and the change in the nominal exchange rate. The system is closed by de…ning the change in the real exchange rate (6) as the sum of the change in the nominal exchange and di¤erence between Foreign and Home consumer price in ‡ation, and de…ning the change in the terms of trade (7) as the sum of the change in the nominal exchange rate and the di¤erence between Foreign and Home producer price in ‡ation. This implies that the terms of trade will be proportional to the real exchange rate, see (8).
By taking the limit of the Home economy's size to zero, the Foreign economy is essentially a closed economy. Since Foreign households consume a minimal amount of Home goods, consumer price in ‡ation coincides with producer price in ‡ation in the Foreign economy. The Foreign economy is therefore characterised by the familiar New Keynesian Phillips curve:
where b t denotes Foreign consumer price in ‡ation and b Y t denotes Foreign output. We assume that the Foreign economy is hit by the same cost-push shock as the Home economy, in order to capture the recent worsening of the in ‡ation-output trade-o¤ across many countries. This means that b t is the same for both countries. The model parameters and baseline calibration are outlined in Table  ( 1).
Policy objectives
We assume that the objective of monetary policy is to stabilize a weighted average of the squared deviations of (consumer price) in ‡ation and output from steady state.
2 So the loss functions of the Home and Foreign central banks, respectively, are given by:
and are the weights that the Home and Foreign central banks place on output stabilization relative to in ‡ation stabilization. A central bank with a low will be characterized as 'hawkish', whereas a central bank with a high is said to be 'dovish'. As argued by Svensson (2003) , (10) captures well the objectives of an in ‡ation targeting central bank.
3 Since the Home economy is assumed to be of size zero, there is no potential for strategic interaction between the central banks.
Results
We examine the policy trade-o¤ facing the Home central bank when both Home and Foreign are hit by the same 'global'cost-push shock. The shock increases in ‡ation and reduces output to an ine¢ cient level in both countries. As we will demonstrate below, the direction in which a rise in shifts the Home central bank's Taylor frontier depends on two factors. First, it depends on whether Home and Foreign goods are what in technical terms is referred to as substitutes or complements in the utility, see e.g. Corsetti & Pesenti (2001) . Home and Foreign goods are substitutes (complements) in the utility, i.e. the marginal utility of one good decreases (increases) with the consumption of another good, when the intratemporal elasticity of substitution is higher (lower) than the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (analytically when: > 1 ( < 1)). Second, the e¤ect on the Home central bank's Taylor frontier depends on whether exports are priced in producers'currency (producer currency pricing) or in consumers'currency (local currency pricing). In what follows, we examine these cases in turn.
Case 1: Producer currency pricing & goods substitutes in the utility
In this scenario we set = 3 and = 2:5, so that Home and Foreign goods are substitutes in the utility ( > 1). The persistence of the global cost-push shock b t is assumed to be 0.99. The remaining parameters are calibrated according to Table (1) . Figure 1 plots the Home Taylor frontiers under this scenario for di¤erent values of . The blue line represents the Home Taylor frontier when the Foreign central bank is most 'hawkish'( = 0:05, which corresponds to the weight in the utility based loss function of the closed economy of Woodford (2003)), whereas the black line represents the Home Taylor frontier when the Foreign central bank is most 'dovish' (the weight on output gap in its loss function = 5). The Home central bank chooses a point on a given Taylor curve depending on its preference, : as the Home central bank becomes more and more dovish (i.e. increases), its chosen point will move along each Taylor Curve from the left to the right. The dotted line represents variances of output and CPI in ‡ation implied by = 1. Figure 1 shows that as the Foreign central bank becomes more dovish (i.e. increases), the Taylor frontier facing the Home country shifts out: so for a given cost-push shock, the Home central bank has to tolerate greater in ‡ation and output volatility. Why does the trade-o¤ facing the Home central bank worsen as the Foreign central bank becomes more dovish? When the Foreign central bank tightens, this acts on Home in ‡ation and output in a way that directly counters the cost-push shock which reduces output and increases in ‡ation in the Home country. The more hawkish the Foreign central bank, the more aggressively it tightens its monetary policy; so more of the Home cost-push shock is countered without the Home central bank having to do anything.
As studied by Corsetti & Pesenti (2001) , a Foreign monetary tightening has two opposing e¤ects on the demand for Home goods and hence on Home output. The demand for Home goods tends to fall as Foreign consumption decreases (aggregate demand e¤ect). On the other hand, a Foreign tightening also leads to a real depreciation of the Home currency and therefore to a terms of trade deterioration. The resulting fall in the foreign price of Home exports increases demand for Home goods, and so its output increases (expenditure switching e¤ect). Which of these two e¤ects dominates under PCP depends on whether Home and Foreign goods are complements or substitutes in the utility. In this case, as Home and Foreign goods are substitutes in the utility the expenditure switching e¤ect dominates because even a small shift in the terms of trade induces aggregate demand to switch from Foreign goods to Home goods. Consequently, Foreign demand for Home goods increases and so does Home output.
The impact of a Foreign tightening on Home in ‡ation can be understood by looking at the relationship between real marginal cost and the terms of trade (see Benigno & Benigno (2006) ). When the goods are substitutes in the utility, the terms of trade deterioration makes Home workers feel poorer and want to work harder, which pushes down on real wages and in ‡ation. Moreover, imported in ‡ation is lower on account of the Foreign monetary tightening because Foreign in ‡ation is lower. Although the e¤ect on Home prices is partly o¤set by a larger Home currency depreciation, the e¤ect of lower Foreign in ‡ation dominates when the goods are substitutes in the utility. This is because when the goods are close substitutes, any movements in the terms of trade will be small, and so the impact of exchange rate movements will be modest. Summing up, the two e¤ects of a cost push shock -higher in ‡ation and lower output -are partially o¤set by Foreign monetary tightening. This result can be interpreted as Foreign monetary tightening policy having a prosper-thyneighbour policy e¤ect on Home (see Corsetti & Pesenti (2001) ). The more dovish the Foreign central bank, the less of this o¤setting force the Home economy gets, so the more the cost push shock a¤ects Home in ‡ation and output: thus its in ‡ation-output trade-o¤ worsens, and the Taylor curve shifts out. In quantitative terms, if we increase from 1 to 2 , the variance of Home in ‡ation increases by 27% and the variance of Home output by 15% under the assumption that = 1.
Case 2: Producer currency pricing & goods complements in the utility
Now assume instead that = 0:3 and = 2:5, i.e. the Home and Foreign goods are complements in the utility ( < 1). Figure 2 plots the Home Taylor frontier under this assumption: as before, the blue line represents the case when = 0:05 (Foreign central bank is hawkish) while the black line represents the case when = 5 (Foreign central bank is dovish). Figure 2 shows that when goods are complements in the utility, the result reverses: as the Foreign central bank becomes more dovish (i.e. increases), the Home Taylor frontier now shifts in, thus improving the trade-o¤ facing the Home central bank. So in this case the Foreign monetary policy tightening ampli…es the cost-push shock from Home's perspective. Home in ‡ation is higher while output is lower.
As before, the Foreign tightening results in lower Foreign consumption and a depreciation of the Home currency. But since Home and Foreign goods are complements, the e¤ect of lower Foreign consumption is to reduce demand for Home goods. So in this case the aggregate demand e¤ect dominates the expenditure switching e¤ect. This leads to a lower demand for Home goods and smaller Home output.
A terms of trade depreciation now increases real marginal cost and also Home in ‡ation. This happens because lower consumption of Foreign goods reduces the marginal utility of Home goods. As the utility from leisure rises relative to that from consumption, Home workers choose to work less, not more. Import in ‡ation will also increase. When the goods are complements in the utility, movements in the terms of trade tend to be large. The in ‡ationary impact of the deterioration of Home's terms of trade associated with a tightening of the Foreign central bank therefore dominates the e¤ect of lower Foreign in ‡ation. This result can be interpreted as Foreign monetary tightening policy having a beggar-thy-neighbour policy e¤ect on Home (see Corsetti & Pesenti (2001) ).
Finally, when the goods are neither substitutes nor complements in the utility (i.e. when = 1), the Foreign central bank's preference has no implications for the in ‡ation-output trade-o¤ facing the Home central bank, because in this special case, Foreign monetary policy has no impact on demand for Home goods (income and substitution e¤ects cancel out). In other words, Home in ‡ation is a function only of Home real marginal cost. So the Home economy is independent of the terms of trade, but its consumption still depends on terms of trade changes.
The …nding that under PCP the Home economy would prefer the Foreign central bank to be hawkish when the goods are substitutes and more dovish when the goods are complements is related to a result by Benigno & Benigno 2008) . In a two country model with cost push shocks they study how the objectives of the national central banks should be designed to maximize the combined welfare of the households in both countries. The authors …nd that the optimal objective of each of foreign central bank can be represented as a weighted sum of domestic producer price in ‡ation and the output gap. The weights attached to each of the variables depend on the substitutability of home and foreign goods. If the goods are substitutes the central banks should respond more to ‡uctuations in the output gap relative to the closed economy version of the model whereas the opposite is the case if the goods are complements. This re ‡ects that when the goods are substitutes, a hawkish policy of one country improves welfare of the other country. The loss function (10) assumes that central banks stabilise consumer price in ‡ation, which is in line with international evidence. However, the literature on optimal monetary policy prescribes that under an assumption of producer currency pricing the correct measure of in ‡ation in the utility based loss function is producer price in ‡ation (see e.g. Paoli (2009) ). We have experimented with such an alternative loss function and the results do not change: The direction of the international spillovers stays the same irrespective of the measure of in ‡ation used in the loss function.
Case 3: Local currency pricing & goods substitutes in the utility
The preceding analysis was conducted under the assumption that prices are sticky in the currency of the producer. Movements in nominal exchange rates are therefore passed through immediately to import prices. This is a useful benchmark, and it is strongly advocated by Obstfeld & Rogo¤ (2000b) on the basis that it implies that a nominal depreciation is associated with a terms of trade deterioration, which is consistent with the data. But as pointed out by Mussa (1986) , the link between changes in exchange rates and changes in national consumer prices is weak empirically. This contradicts one of the key implications of producer currency pricing. As a robustness check we therefore repeat our analysis under the assumption that prices are sticky in the currency of the consumer rather than the producer (local currency pricing).
The model with local currency pricing is essentially a stripped down version of the small open economy model developed by Lipinska (2008) . Since the Foreign country is essentially a closed economy, the change in the pricing assumption does not alter the set-up and the equilibrium condition of Foreign, given by (9). But for Home this means several changes.
Since the law of one price does not hold, the relative price of Home to Foreign goods di¤ers between the two countries. Following Benigno (2004) we de…ne T t and T t to represent the relative price of the imported good in terms of the one produced domestically, expressed in the local currency. The assumption that a Home producer can charge di¤erent prices in Home and in Foreign markets implies that the in ‡ation rate of Home-produced goods in the Home market, b H;t , di¤ers from the in ‡ation rate of Home-produced goods in the Foreign market, b H;t . Re ‡ecting this, there are two di¤erent Phillips curves for Home goods depending on whether they are traded at home or abroad ( (11) and (12)). Home in ‡ation and Home export in ‡ation both depend on real marginal costs and on the relative price of Home to Foreign goods in local currency. Moreover, Home export in ‡ation also depends on the real exchange rate, which stems from the fact that revenues of Home exporters are denominated in Foreign currency and costs are in Home currency. Similarly, as Foreign producers also charge di¤erent prices in the two countries, we obtain a separate in ‡ation equation for imports in the Home country, b F;t (13). Its dynamics depend not only on Foreign real marginal cost but also on the price of Foreign exports relative to Home goods and on the real exchange rate. The di¤erence in relative prices when denominated in Home and Foreign currency is also re ‡ected in the aggregate demand equation (14).
Finally, under local currency pricing the real exchange rate and the terms of trade are not proportional (see (16) - (20)). In fact, a real exchange rate depreciation is likely to be associated with a terms of trade improvement since when prices are sticky in local currency, an exchange rate depreciation raises the home currency price of exports, but leaves import prices unchanged. Since in our framework a fraction of prices are free to adjust in each period, a real exchange rate depreciation could also be associated with a terms of trade deterioration.
This becomes increasingly likely if we reduce the degree of price stickiness, but in the benchmark calibration we …nd that the terms of trade improve when the real exchange rate depreciates. The expenditure switching e¤ect of an exchange rate depreciation is therefore reduced relative to the model with producer currency pricing: there is no shift towards Home goods and relative prices of imported goods are not much a¤ected (see also Betts & Devereux (2000) ). A depreciation of the real exchange rate increases revenues of Home exporters. Higher revenues also mean higher Home demand for Home goods (because Home wages also increase), leading to in ‡ationary pressures in this sector.
The Taylor curves under the assumption of local currency pricing and > 1 ( = 2:5, = 3) are illustrated in Figure 3 . As before, the blue line represents the case when = 0:05 (Foreign central bank is hawkish) while the black line represents the case when = 5 (Foreign central bank is dovish). Figure 3 shows that the Taylor frontier facing Home now shifts inward as the Foreign central bank becomes more dovish, rather than outward, as in case 1. Why is this? When the Foreign central bank tightens to counter the cost push shock, the fall in Foreign wages and prices generates an improvement in the terms of trade for Home. The Foreign tightening also leads to a depreciation of the Home nominal exchange rate. Since prices are sticky in local currencies, an exchange rate depreciation results in an increase in revenues for Home exporters and reduction in revenues for Foreign exporters. As a result, since only a fraction of exporters can adjust their destination market prices, we observe a reduction of Home export in ‡ation and an increase in Home import in ‡ation. The rise in the Foreign exchange rate means that these Foreign currency revenues now buy a larger quantity of goods denominated in Home currency. This causes Home workers to feel wealthier, and so they want to work less. The resulting fall in labour supply pushes up on Home real wages and therefore on Home in ‡ation. On the other hand, Foreign workers feel poorer as a result of the Foreign tightening, and Foreign demand for Home goods falls. So the two e¤ects of a cost-push shock at Home -increased in ‡ation and reduced output -are ampli…ed. The more dovish the Foreign central bank, the weaker this amplifying e¤ect, so that the Home central bank can achieve lower in ‡ation and output volatility.
In sum: when products are priced in the local (consumer's) currency, the combinations of in ‡ation and output variability achievable by the Home central bank improve as the Foreign central bank becomes more dovish: exactly the opposite of what we found for producer currency pricing. So like Betts & Devereux (2000) we …nd that under consumer currency pricing a Foreign monetary policy tightening is beggar-thy-neighbour. To give an estimate of the size of the e¤ect: if we increase the foreign central bank's weight on output stabilisation from 1 to 2, we reduce the variance of in ‡ation by about 13% and the variance of output by 6% under the assumption that = 1.
Shape of the Taylor curve under LCP and PCP
We also …nd that the Taylor curves facing the Home central bank are much ‡atter and squashed in the case of local currency pricing. Why is that? Under producer currency pricing, if the Home central bank tightens, the Home currency appreciates and the Home terms of trade improve. This makes Home workers feel richer, so they work less. This o¤sets some of the reduction in real wages and in ‡ation achieved by Home's monetary tightening. Thus, a large reduction in output is needed to achieve a given reduction in in ‡ation, making the Taylor curve under PCP relatively steep. Under local currency pricing, however, a tightening by the Home central bank worsens the Home terms of trade: Home prices fall and so do import prices but not much as they are sticky in Home currency. The worsening terms of trade makes Home workers feel poorer, so they work harder. This further reduces real wages and in ‡ation. So only a small fall in output is needed to generate a given reduction in in ‡ation, making the Taylor curve under LCP relatively ‡at.
Sticky wages
The e¤ect of changes in the terms of trade on labour supply is an important channel of transmission between the two countries in the model. Since changes in labour supply are re ‡ected in changes in real wages, this implies that the analysis is sensitive to the degree of wage ‡exibility. In the model, when the goods are substitutes in the utility, a deterioration in the terms of trade increases labour supply in Home as Home workers feel poorer and work harder. This shift in labour supply induces a fall in real wages, thus reducing in ‡ation and increasing output. This is a key channel via which Foreign monetary policy -which a¤ects Home's terms of trade -shifts the Home Taylor frontier.
We have experimented with a version of the model where monopolistically competitive households set nominal wages in staggered contracts as in Erceg et al. (2000) . The introduction of wage stickiness does not alter the ranking of the Taylor curves. But as shown by Figure 4 , sticky wages greatly reduces in ‡ation volatility. Now the shift in labour supply induces a much smaller change in real wages and thus it attenuates its e¤ect on in ‡ation at Home. So nominal wage stickiness ampli…es price stickiness by reducing the impact of the labour supply channel. When the Home central bank places equal weight on stabilising in ‡ation and output ( = 1, represented by the dotted line), Home output volatility is also much more stable than under ‡exible wages for any value of . But if Home places only small weight on output stabilization (like in Woodford (2003) 's closed economy, where = 0:05), the variance of Home output is still strongly a¤ected by the preferences of the Foreign central bank.
Discussion
The analysis clearly highlights two key factors in determining the impact on foreign monetary on a small open economy, namely the substitutability of goods produced in di¤erent countries, and the choice of invoicing currency. On the substitutability versus complementarity point the literature does o¤er some guidance on what would be reasonable parameter values. Obstfeld & Rogo¤ (2000a) survey various trade studies and …nd that goods are rather substitutes with elasticities in the neighbourhood of 5 to 6. Since the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is usually assumed to be less than 1, this would suggest that the goods are more likely to be substitutes in the utility. On the speci…cation of invoicing currency, arguments have been raised against both PCP and LCP. On the one hand, it has been observed that nominal depreciations tend to be followed by a terms of trade deterioration (price of exports falls relative to the price of imports). This would suggest that local currency pricing is counterfactual. On the other hand, producer currency pricing implies that nominal exchange rate changes should be passed through straight away into consumer prices. This too is counterfactual, as Devereux & Engel (2007) have pointed out: there is a substantial body of empirical evidence establishing that the link between movements in exchange rates and changes and national consumer prices is weak. As a way of addressing these observations, Devereux & Engel (2007) propose a model with high pass-through to import prices and weak pass-through to consumer goods prices.
Note that the invoicing currency matters in the preceding analysis because prices are assumed to be sticky in local currency. The assumption of price stickiness ensures that Home's terms of trade shifts in the opposite directions under PCP and LCP in response to a Foreign monetary tightening. To illustrate this point, consider the case of LCP under the assumption of price ‡exibility. If prices are ‡exible, then two scenarios of PCP and LCP are equivalent (see 6). When the Foreign central bank tightens monetary policy, the revenues of Home exporters increase and export prices of Home goods in Foreign currency decrease. This leads to a worsening of the terms of trade.
Our analysis is based on the assumption that asset markets are complete. Asset market completeness guarantees that the marginal rates of substitution in consumption are equalised between countries in all states and at all times in nominal terms (see Chari et al. (2002) ). This implies that there is a strong positive correlation between Home and Foreign consumption. Any improvement in Home's terms of trade will facilitate an increase in Home consumption and thus an increase in real wages. In a setup with a lower degree of …nancial integration the countries would be less able to …nance an increase in consumption by borrowing from abroad. Instead they would tend to keep their trade in balance by adjusting quantities produced.
5 As a result, the terms of trade would be more stable, and the e¤ect of Foreign policy on the Home in ‡ation-output trade-o¤ would be reduced.
Conclusions
Monetary policy of a large Foreign economy a¤ects the trade-o¤ between in‡ation and output volatility faced by the central bank of Home, a small open economy. The impact of Foreign monetary policy on Home works through a demand channel as well as a supply channel. A key conclusion emerging from our analysis is that depending on the invoicing currency of exports and the degree of substitutability between Home and Foreign goods, a more 'dovish' central bank in the large economy could either improve or worsen the in ‡ation-output trade-o¤ faced by the small economy. Under PCP, the trade-o¤ faced by the Home central bank is likely to worsen as the Foreign central bank becomes 'dovish' and more focused on output stabilisation rather than in ‡ation stabilisation. However, the opposite is true under LCP. We have analysed this issue using a model of sticky prices and ‡exible wages in an environment of complete markets. We note that the terms of trade channel which leads to shifts in Home labour supply and wages in response to Foreign monetary policy as well as leading to shifts in the demand for Home relative to Foreign goods is the key driver of our results. A lower degree of …nancial market integration or the presence of sticky wages would reduce the importance of the terms of trade channel in a¤ecting the trade-o¤ faced by the Home central bank. respectively, the prices P H;t0 (i) and P H;t0 (i) …xed at the level chosen at time t 0 ; M C H t -nominal marginal cost in the home traded sector at time t, H;tmarkup shock in the home traded sector.
It follows that when prices are ‡exible, the optimal prices in the home traded sector (the internal price e P H;t and export price e P H;t ) are set at any time according to the following relations: Combining the two equations we get that: e P H;t (i) = S t e P H;t (i)
This is equivalent to the PCP scenario.
